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SYMBOLS AND SPOILS: FRAMING AND MOBILIZING
STRUCTURES IN COLOMBIA'S ENDLESS CIVIL WAR

JOSH WHEATLEY

The civiL war that has pLagued Colombia over the past four decades is often explained in the context ofclass-based
theory. This study will examine class-based theory as it reLates to Colombian socioeconomic structure, showing that
it does not completely explain many specific elements that have developed in the war. This paper wiLL instead
analyze the use offraming mechanisms used by each faction, as weLL as the mobiLization structures in which the
framing arrangements are manipulated. Finally, it will demonstrate how the Leaders of the FARC and AUC use
these groups to promote their own interests.

A civil war has plagued Colombia over the
past four decades, causing over 35,000 deaths.
The hostilities officially began in 1964 when
leftist insurgents, responding to military aggression, formed guerilla armies seeking to overthrow the government and establish a regime
based on leftist ideology. According to classbased theory, a civil war in Colombia is neither
unusual nor unexpected. In an environment of
such obvious inequality, with masses of impoverished peasants, the system's mere structure
should eventually lead to the uniting of the
lower class in open rebellion against the upper
class. However, class-based theory does not
explain many specific elements of the Colombian Civil War and may in fact contradict
them. While the conflict originally consisted of
hostility between a movement claiming to represent the interests of the peasants and a military representing the interests of the oligarchy,
it has evolved into a completely different kind
of quarrel.

The war currently involves three principal
factions: the Colombian military, the leftwing guerilla group Colombian Revolutionary
Armed Forces (FARC), and the right-wing paramilitary group United Self-Defense Units of
Colombia (AUC). Historically, the major conflict has been between the FARC and the military, but in recent years the AUC has emerged as
a powerful force, fighting against the FARC on
their own, independent of the military. In 1998,
the Colombian military withdrew from many
FARC-controlled areas as a gestute of peace, and
since then the FARC and the AUC have
emerged as the conflict's principal actors and
enemIes.
The FARC and the AUC both claim to be
representing the interests of the common
Colombian while opposing the oppression perpetrated by the elites. Despite this, both groups
are actively involved in violating the human
rights of the citizens they profess to protect. This
article will seek to explain why the Colombian
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Civil War has become a conflict in which the
principal actors are poor people fighting against
poor people. The leaders of the two groups use
culture-based collective action mechanisms to
mobilize their followers and convince them that
the cause they promote is in fact a noble venture
with a purpose to protect the Colombian culture
and way of life. Further, the leaders of these
movements are in fact significantly concerned
with advancing their own interests, using the
mobilized masses as their tools. It is the presence
of these features that challenges the assumptions
of class-based theory.
To accomplish this, I will first examine
class-based theory as it relates to the Colombian
socioeconomic structure. I will then analyze the
organization of the FARC and the AUe, focusing on both the framing mechanisms utilized by
leaders of the two groups to rally their members
to action and the mobilization structures in
which these framing arrangements are manipulated. Finally, I will examine the organization and operations of the FARC and AUC to
demonstrate how the leaders use these groups
to promote their own interests. While the bulk
of my evidence will come from studies presented
in scholarly books and journals, I will also rely
on documents produced by the FARC and the
AUC that state their official viewpoints, actions,
and goals. I will also use reports published by
international NGOs providing data about the
Colombian socioeconomic structure and statistics related to the conflict.
HISTORICAL COLOMBIAN CLASS STRUCTURE

Colombia has a history of socioeconomic
class separation. In 1849, two political parties
formed within the elite oligarchy. Those same
two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals,
are still the predominant, if not exclusive, political actors in modern Colombian politics (Kline
and Gray 2000). They are basically catch-all parties that cater to the interests of the upper and
middle classes (Boudon 2000, 35). Economic
disparity is rampant; the World Bank gives
Colombia the fifth-highest rating of disparity in
the world, with 61.5% of the wealth owned by
20% of the population. The disparity becomes
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even more evident when one realizes that, within
that sector, 46.9% of Colombia's wealth is
controlled by only the top 10% of the nation's
citizens (Center for Balanced Development
n.d.). Because of this tremendous inequality,
the peasant class has little representation in the
national political structure.
As a result of its exclusion from mainstream politics, the peasant class has historically
had to make one of two choices. Most peasants
chose to support one of the two elite parties.
Those desiring to own land and survive through
subsistence agriculrure generally followed the
Liberal party, whereas those who were content to
survive under the employ of the elite landowners
usually upheld the Conservative agenda. For
decades following the establishment of democracy, party affiliation was an important element
in nearly all Colombians' concept of cultural and
political identity (Chepesiuk 1999).
The second option, which was practiced by
a minority of the peasants, was to resort to
unconventional tactics to promote their interests. As early as the 1920s, peasant groups
attempted armed insurgency as a means to bring
about social reform, but the military easily
defeated all uprisings (Tickner 1998). In the late
1920s, Jorge Gaitan, an emerging leader of the
Liberal party, actively promoted social and agrarian reforms to benefit the lower class. However,
efforts led by radical conservatives and supported
by moderates within both parties impeded
implementation of any meaningful reform
(Hoskin and Murillo 1999).
Following the 1946 election of Conservative Ospina Perez to the presidency, violence
broke out among rural supporters of both
political parties. The conflict escalated following
the murder of Jorge Gaitan in 1948 and resulted
in a civil war known as La Violencia, a ten-year
period of extreme conflict. According to Kline
and Gray (2000), the violence was instigated
mainly by elite Conservatives, who sought to
consolidate their power, and by elite Liberals,
who sought to prevent such consolidation. During this time, radical leftist guerillas also established a presence in the countryside, hoping to
take advantage of the turbulent environment
to trigger a communist revolution. In 1953, a

WHEATLEY

military government took power, but the fighting continued until 1958, when the Colombian
National Congress and the citizens adopted a
new institution called the National Front (Kline
and Gray 2000).
The National Front established a system of
power sharing between the two parties, which
agreed to alternate control of the executive office
until 1974 and share an equal number of elected
and appointed offices (Kline and Gray 2000).
While it established peace between these two
elitist groups, the agreement failed to address
underlying socioeconomic problems that continued to plague the population's lower class. Once
again at peace with each other, the two parties
supported a violent military campaign against
the more radical leftist insutgents that maintained demands for extensive social reforms
(Hoskin and Mutillo 1999,38-9).
Rather than promoting needed agrarian
reform, the National Front established policies to
allow increased private ownership of land in
rural areas. Under the guise of battling leftist
insutgency, the military violently displaced many
peasants from these newly privatized areas, forcing them into more remote and inhospitable
regions. The new peasant settlements often
formed community defense forces, which laid
the foundation for later formation of guerilla
armies such as the FARC and the AUC (Vargas

1998,23-4).
ClASS-BASED THEORY

Various theories seek to explain the behavior of individuals based on the socioeconomic
environment in which they live. Two of these are
structuralist and rational choice theory. Structuralist theory asserts that social systems consisting of extreme socioeconomic disparity
inevitably lead to revolution, because the system's structure ptovides the lower classes no
other way to remedy the situation. Skocpol
(1979) argues this view in case studies of the
Russian, Chinese, and French revolutions, all of
which were the result of mobilized peasant
classes overthrowing elite ruling classes.
The second class-based theory, rational
choice, also allows for economically constrained

behavior. This school of thought focuses on
"rational and strategic individuals who make
choices within constraints to obtain their desired
ends" (Levi 1997, 23). In other words, individuals determine their behavior based on the costs
and benefits of their possible actions. Individuals
living in a system of socioeconomic disparity
may view armed insurgence against the upper
class as providing great potential benefits for
future prosperity, whereas failure to rebel could
result in the continuance of poverty. In such a
case, the rational behavior would clearly be violent rebellion against the elites. Armed conflict
with other members of the lower class would not
be rational, as it would bring about few, if any,
economlC gaIns.
Skidmore and Smith (2001) analyze Latin
American politics from a structuralist, classbased perspective, focusing on such aspects as
international division of labor and resourcebased economies. While they do not include a
case study of Colombia, they do analyze classbased social movements in such nations as Mexico and Peru. Their model would predict that the
Colombian peasant class would have at some
point in history united in collective protest
against the elite upper class, with such action
resulting in at the least the creation of political
parties to represent their interests and at the
most a revolution to overthrow the oppressive
regIme.
Considering both the historical and current socioeconomic structure, the fact that civil
war has raged for thirty-seven years should not
be surprising, especially based upon the predictions of class-based theory. What is surprising is
the fact that in recent years, when the violence
has escalated to its highest levels, the nature of
the conflict has changed considerably. As the
FARC has increased its power, the AUC has
matched the escalation. However, the lowerechelon foot soldiers of both groups are made up
almost entirely of peasants from the lower
classes. Rather than a class-based struggle with
peasants fighting against elites, this conflict has
turned into a power struggle between different
groups that are able to successfully mobilize the
peasants to fight for them. In the following sections, I will examine how culture-based theory
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may help explain this apparent contradiction of
class-based theory.
FRAMING MECHANISMS

One of the key elements for successful collective action is the use of proper framing mechanisms. According to collective action theory,
framing includes the use of cultural symbols to
mobilize the masses into group participation.
Tarrow argues, "Inscribing grievances in overall
frames that identify an injustice, attribute the
responsibility for it to others, and propose solution to it is a central activity of social movements" (1998, 111). Tarrow further asserts that
movement leaders "orient their movements'
frames toward action in particular contexts and
fashion them at the intersection between a target
population's culture and their own values and
goals" (1998, 110).
Both the FARC and AUC have been successful in applying these framing mechanisms to
their own causes. Both groups have delegated the
blame for social injustices suffered by Colombian peasants to external sources. Each of the
groups also appeals to basic cultural beliefs and
desires of the Colombian peasant class. Both the
FARC and the AUC claim to be the true advocates of the Colombian people, defending the
common man against oppression by the political
and economic elites. In appealing to the concept
of cultural identity as free Colombians, these
leaders elevate their soldiers' status from that of
simple mercenaries to that of freedom fighters.
FRAMING AND THE FARC

In the early 1960s, leftist rebels officially
founded the FARC with the ultimate goal of
seizing control of the national government
through armed insurgence, becoming the first
rebel group to actively promote change through
a mainly offensive rather than defensive campaign (Vargas 2000). Since its inception, the
FARC has evolved from being a minor inconvenience for the government to its current existence as a military force of 15,000 members
and a political power controlling a significant
amount of territory (Pardo 2000, 69). FARC
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leaders have taken advantage of the continually
changing situation within Colombia to increase
their fundraising and recruiting efforts. However, their culture-based framing structures have
remained constant over the years.
FARC propaganda disseminated over the
internet helps the outside observer to understand
the group's domestic framing mechanisms.
According to its official homepage, the FARC was
established after a group of peasants withstood an
armed attack perpetrated by the Colombian military and supported by the United States. In the
wake of this attack the FARC emerged as "a revolutionary program calling together all the citizens
who dream of a Colombia for Colombians, with
equality of opportunities and equitable distribtion of wealth, and where among us all we can
build peace with social equality and sovereignty"
(FARC-EP n.d.). Throughout the years, the
number of active guerillas and the level of violence
have increased, as the FARC claims its members
remain "ready to give everything, including their
lives, to realize the dreams of equality and justice
that inspire our struggle" (FARC-EP n.d.).
FARC leaders have framed their armed
insurgence as a struggle to protect the interests of
the innocent Colombian citizen that has been
and continues to be oppressed by an elitist,
foreign-influenced government. As their webpage asserts, the FARes armed insurgence is
"an option that has been imposed upon the
Colombian people by the ruling class which
follows the orientation of the government of
the United States of America" (FARC-EP n.d).
The principal symbol used by the FARC is the
outline of the Colombian nation inscribed upon
the Colombian flag, a simple appeal to the
Colombian identity. While labeled by the government as insurgents and criminals, FARC
guerillas can view themselves as freedom fighters
possessing the honor to participate in Colombia's
liberation.
The FARC also appeals to the people
through revisiting historical incidents of peasantclass collective action. The peasant uprisings of
the 1920s and 1930s are heralded as the beginning of the people's movement to free Colombia
from socioeconomic oppression, and the leftist
movements during the period of La Violencia
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and the years that followed are considered a
continuation of the same battle and a predecessor of the current guerilla insurgence (FARC-EP
n.d.). FARC leaders have clearly taken advantage
of historical events to strengthen their framing
structure, even though most of the uprisings
prior to 1948 were supported by a faction of the
Liberal party and promoted moderate agrarian
reform that was nowhere near the FARe's current stated goal to overthrow the government
and replace it with a communist regime.
FRAMING AND THE AUC
On the other end of the conflict, the paramilitary groups of the AUC have emerged as
well-armed, capable opponents of the FARe's
guerillas. The AUe's groups trace their origins to
1965, when the government passed legislation
authorizing the military to arm civilians in order
to fight the guerillas. While this policy was later
revoked, the tradition of private armies had by
then become well established in the Colombian
culture (Chernick 1998a, 28). In the 1980s,
landowners such as drug lords and cattle ranchers began the widespread establishment of private armies to protect their holdings from the
guerillas (Richani 2000,41).
Carlos Castano first became involved in
the paramilitary movement in 1981 after FARC
guerillas kidnapped and murdered his wealthy
cattle-ranching father. Shortly thereafter, Castano allied himself with Pablo Escobar, a powerful drug lord, in a vengeful organized fight
against the guerillas. Over the years his group
gained power with support from the military and
greater revenue from the drug trade. In 1996,
Castano united various paramilitary groups to
form an organization called the United SelfDefense Units of Colombia (AUC). The AUC
has emerged as the most powerful and influential
paramilitary group, with a well-trained and wellorganized army of estimated strength as low as
4,000 active members (Richani 2000, 39) and
as high as 11,000 (Wilson 2001).
Similar to the FARe, the AUC utilizes cultural framing mechanisms to justifY its cause.
According to the AUC webpage, paramilitary
groups emerged in the late 1970s and early

1980s to defend the Colombian people from the
growing guerilla threat. The AUC propaganda
allows that the guerilla movement began with
noble intentions to bring about necessary social
and political reforms but asserts that it had
degenerated into a simple criminal operation
heavily involved in drug trafficking and kidnapping that threatened the livelihood of the rural
Colombian citizen (AUC n.d.). In the AUe's
view, this threat is also demonstrated by the
FARe's desire to take property away from
wealthy landowners, upon whom peasants rely
for land and employment.
The paramilitary group also argues that the
government and the military give priority protection to the oligarchy and fail to provide
proper protection for the lower class (AUC n.d.).
In the wake of such threats to the Colombian
way of life, it was necessary for the paramilitary
groups to step in as the defenders. The AUC also
uses the Colombian flag and map as its principal
symbols, and its very name-the United 'Self
Defense' Units of Colombia-appeals to protection of the Colombian identity.
Like the FARe, the AUC uses historical
trends to promote cultural loyalty to its cause.
AUC leaders appeal to the traditional differences
between the peasants, such as the original concept of identity determined by party affiliation
and the Conservative-supported peasant armies
of the La Violencia Civil War. They also promote
the economic model of the peasant class relying
upon large landowners to provide them with
land and employment. The AUC framing mechanism presents this system as the model that will
provide peasants the greatest levels of prosperity
and stability and identifies the agrarian redistribution agenda of the FARC as implausible and
unstable because it will lead to chaos and poverty
for the lower class (Suarez 1998).
MOBILIZATION STRUCTURES

While framing is an important aspect of
collective mobilization, an organized structure
to manage collective action must also exist. As
Tarrow states, "Social movements do not depend
on framing alone; they must bring people
together in the field, shape coalitions, confront
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opponents, and assure their own future after the
exhilaration of the peak of mobilization has
passed" (1998, 123). He further analyzes many
aspects of mobilizing structures, but one concept
particularly relevant to this case is his concept of
external resources facilitating the establishment
of these structures. While Tarrow focuses on
such external resources as the media to reach and
motivate extensive audiences, I seek to modify
his approach. I argue that actions by the Colombian government have helped to improve the
cultural image of the FARC and AUC movements, thus increasing the groups' support
among Colombian citizens and serving as external resources that have strengthened their mobilizing structures.
One of the principal external resources aiding the establishment of mobilizing structures
for both the FARC and the AUC has been the
general weakness of the Colombian government.
Perceived and actual regime weaknesses have
allowed the FARC and AUC to expand their
objectives as well as prevent the government
from intervening to stop the spread of these
groups' power and influence. FARC leaders have
lost confidence in the government's ability to
protect them and respect their interests should
they choose to lay down their arms, and AUC
leaders have recognized that the government
will not interfere with their violent counterinsurgency efforts.
The attitudes and perceptions of both
groups can largely be attributed to the emergence of Colombia as a leading international
supplier of illegal drugs, an event that has been
a key factor in exposing the regime's weakness
and inability to maintain order within its own
borders. For many years, Colombia has ceded to
pressure from the United States to reduce the
supply of illegal drugs flowing from within its
borders. In recent years, the government instituted a U.S.-sponsored program to eradicate
coca fields by spraying them with pesticides from
aircraft flying above or by sending the military to
burn them. Most of this eradication has occurred
in the southern part of the nation controlled by
the FARe, as the government has consistently
attempted to correlate the guerilla movement
with drug trafficking (Vargas 2000).
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Rather than having its power and influence
diminished by the eradication efforts, the FARC
has flourished. Many peasants hold coca cultivation as their principal source of income and view
the eradication efforts, which also damage other
crops, as a direct attack on their livelihood
(Molano 2000, 30-1). The government's eradication program has clearly been an external force
that has strengthened the FARe's mobilizing
structure while legitimizing its framing mechanisms. To the coca farmers, the FARC is their
only protection against a tyrannical government
seeking to destroy their livelihood for no apparent reason. As the FARC informs them that the
government acts this way to please a foreign
power while harming its own citizens, these
farmers become culturally committed to supporting the movement that seeks to protect
Colombia and allow them to live life according
to their desires. Most of them are then very willing to pay taxes to the FARC, and the individuals more committed to that desire to join the
noble movement protecting the Colombian way
of life choose to become active members of the
guerilla army (Vargas 2000).
While alienating its own citizens, the government's eradication program has failed to stem
the flow of coca production in southern Colombia, with most reports estimating that production
has actually increased (Aviles 2001). Drugrelated money constitutes an estimated 60% of
the FARe's yearly revenue, which has been projected to be as high as 600 million U.S. dollars a
year (Pardo 2000, 70). With the FARe's burgeoning money base and the increasing number
of displaced peasants available and committed to
join the organization, its membership has
increased from a mere 500 in 1970 to current
estimates of 15,000. The increased revenue has
assisted the FARC in paying, training, and
equipping its members, which has greatly
increased its military capability (Vargas 2000).
Not only has the eradication program
assisted in the FARe's growth, but it has also
served as an external resource to strengthen the
AUe's mobilizing structure. As the government
and military consistently assert that the guerilla
movement and drug trafficking are one and
the same, they fail to address the issue of drug
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production in areas controlled by the AUe.
Various reports imply that the AUC is much
more involved in the drug trade than the FARe,
but the government refuses to acknowledge or
address this claim (Montalvo 2000, 9-10). In
attacking its principal enemy while leaving the
AUC alone, the government has helped to legitimize the paramilitary movement. Supporters of
the AUC may desire political reform, but they
do not wish for the complete overthrow of the
regime sought by the guerillas. Seeing the government actively working toward the same goal
as the AUC likely strengthens their cultural
resolve that the paramilitaries really do seek the
welfare of the Colombian nation.
Increasing drug-related revenue has
allowed the AUC to become better equipped and
better trained, resulting in more military successes. While individuals truly culturally committed to the AUC would sustain the group in
times of success and failure, victories are always
better than losses for fortifYing support. A proud
Colombian may see the realization of national
success and prosperity as inevitable, and if the
AUC is providing the mechanism through which
that goal is obtained, it must be the true proponent of Colombian culture and identity.
Prior to the coca eradication project, other
actions by the government had also bolstered the
strength of the two groups. Throughout the civil
war, various administrations had attempted to
make peace with the FARe. In 1984, the FARC
and the military declared a cease-fire, and many
members of the FARC established a legitimate
communist party known as the Patriotic Union
(UP). While the government and the FARC
seemed to desire peace, other interested parties
did not. Over the next two years paramilitaries
and drug traffickers murdered over 3,000 members of the UP, causing it to be virtually nonexistent. The deaths were rarely investigated and
few if any of those responsible were prosecuted
(Vargas 1998, 25). As a result of the government's failure to protect its members attempting
to assimilate into the political sphere, the FARC
gained new resolve to continue its armed insurgency. Similarly, paramilitaries realized that the
government either could not or would not stop
them from murdering their enemies, which

encouraged them to continue doing it. While
this event preceded the AUe, it laid the foundation for the formation of future paramilitary
groups.
Government failures continued to facilitate
the strengthening of the rebel groups' mobilization structures. In 1994, Ernesto Sam per
assumed the office of president, actively promoting peace negotiations with the FARe. However,
shortly after his inauguration, reports surfaced
that he had accepted campaign donations from
various drug cartels, and he instantly lost nearly
all credibility. The FARC immediately withdrew
from peace negotiations, and during the next
few years escalated its offensive campaign to the
highest levels ever (Suarez 1998). The paramilitaries responded by also increasing their strength,
which likely factored into the formation of the
AUC (Richani 2000, 39). In this case, as Chernick asserts, the corruption of one political
leader provided extensive external fortification of
the groups' mobilization structures:
With Satnper reduced to practicing the politics of
survival, the growing vacuum at the center of power
has prompted matlY political sectors-Congress, the
military, party leaders, gatnonales, business, paramilitaries, guerillas-to push their own agendas
and take advatltage of the executive's weakness.
(1998b,41)

FARC AND AUC LEADERS:
CULTURAL CRUSADERS OR RATIONAL ACTORS?
Until now, I have focused on framing mechanisms and mobilization structures used by the
FARC and AUC to legitimize their movements
and recruit membership. However, leaders of
these groups have utilized these mobilization
devices not just to establish their organizations but
also to promote their own interests. Though I feel
that culture-based theoty is a more viable explanation for Colombia's apparent contradiction of
class-based theory, rational choice theory also
deserves consideration. Not only has this crusade
promoted positive action for the group, but the
actions of the FARC and AUC have also provided
individual-level benefits to their leaders, providing
them rational incentives to continue the fight.
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While there appears to be strong evidence
that cultural framing plays an important role in
mobilizing members of the FARC and the AUe,
rational choice theorists could argue that membership in these organizations results simply
from rational actors seeking to further their own
economic interests. It is certain that members of
these factions are mercenaries; they receive
monthly income for their efforts, and both
groups generally pay better than the military
(Chepesiuk 1999, 8). They may also feel that
failure to join one of the groups will bring about
accusations by both factions that they support
the other, which may threaten their future survival. An examination of each group's leadership
may prove useful in evaluating the merit of
rational choice theory in this context.
THE FARC LEADERSHIP

As he entered office in 1998, President
Andres Pastrana showed his interest in negotiating peace with the FARC by ceding to its
demand that the military withdraw from a
42,000 square kilometer area in southern
Colombia. He was also willing to discuss offering clemency to FARC leaders and allowing
them to participate in the government if they
were willing to make peace. The Barco administration had made a similar offer to the M-19 terrorist group in 1991, which resulted in that
organization's demilitarization and the assimilation of its members into the legitimate political
sphere (Tickner 1998,62).
FARC leaders gladly accepted control of
the area, but rather than responding with their
own peaceful overtures, they converted the
region into a virtual sovereign state within
Colombia and then escalated the hostility. The
FARC now uses the demilitarized zone to recruit
and train new soldiers, cultivate coca crops, hide
hostages and kidnap victims, and execute prisoners (Pardo 2000). FARC leaders are also exerting increasing influence in the local politics of
municipalities they control. In some cities,
FARC operatives manage such simple tasks as
issuing marriage licenses and building permits.
Reports have surfaced claiming that since
assuming total power over the region, the FARC
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leadership has become divided over issues such as
local power struggles and corruption involving
taxes and other public funds (Chernick 2000,
36-7).
The desire to control local politics and the
subsequent spoils, the kidnapping of the citizens
they are supposed to protect, and the escalation
of the war effort in response to peaceful gestures
by the government do not prove that FARC
leaders are fully self-interested, but this evidence
does raise the possibility that their agenda
includes more than just achieving socioeconomic
equality for the peasants. Pardo asserts that the
FARC's estimated $600 million per year revenue
makes it the wealthiest rebel group in the history
of the earth (2000, 70), which raises the legitimate question of whether its leaders receive economic kickbacks to complement their political
and military power.
THE AUC LEADERSHIP
Behind all the rhetoric of defending the
Colombian citizen and the Colombian way of
life, the AUC seems to be little more than a wellarmed and well-organized crime syndicate. Various independent studies such as Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch report
that since its inception the AUC has been
responsible for 70% of war-related human rights
abuses (Aviles 2001, 43-5; Human Rights
Watch n.d.). AUC soldiers are routinely involved
in massacres of peasants they accuse of cooperating with the guerillas. After a well-planned paramilitary operation that resulted in the murder of
thirty civilians in the town of Mapiripan, Carlos
Castano was quoted as saying, "These were not
innocent peasants. They were guerillas dressed as
peasants" (Chernick 1998a, 31).
As stated previously, the AUC is likely to
be heavily involved in drug trafficking. Exact
data on the AUe's drug-related revenue is scarce,
but there are other indicators that the selfdefense force is also a business venture. Similar
to the FARe, the AUC has begun to develop
an extensive presence in the local politics of
municipalities in its sphere of influence,
including taxation of legitimate businesses to
complement its taxation of coca production.
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Perhaps a stronger indication is a recent report in
the Colombian newspaper El Nuevo Herald citing
evidence that a power struggle was occurring
within the AUC leadership and that Castano
faced increasing difficulties in controlling the
actions oflower-levelleaders operating in the field
(Rodriguez 2001). An organization that exists
solely to promote the defense of Colombia will
not likely have great internal dissention, but when
power over local politics and the extreme potential wealth of the drug trade are factored in, such
conflict becomes much more realistic.
The prevalence of former military officers
in the AUC leadership also raises questions
abour the organization's true motives. To contradict negative press reporting that the military
and the AUC have close ties, the government has
demanded that the military punish its members
who do in fact associate with and support the
paramilitaries. Many officers have been censured, and some expelled, but a great number of
them have simply taken high-paying positions in
the AUC command structure (Chernick 1998a,
31-2). It is possible that these military officers
identifY with the AUC and support its ideology,
but it is more likely that the group has sufficient
money to lure such individuals into its ranks.
The officers can provide the soldiers with invaluable training, which will increase the likelihood
of military success and the expansion of the
sphere of influence.
CULTURE OR RATIONAL CHOICE?

The extreme flexibility of rational choice
theory makes it possible to successfully apply
that approach to almost any situation, but I
feel that in this case the cultural aspects cannot
be ignored. As stated earlier, FARC membership
does not likely exceed 15,000, with AUC membership likely fewer than 11,000. While these are
considerable numbers for groups of such nature,
they still constitute a small minority of Colombia's population of 40 million. Economic hardships have abounded in Colombia in recent
years, but many destitute peasants have chosen
to move to urban areas seeking work rather than
hiring on with the FARC or the AUe. If enlisting in these armies was truly the best economic

option available, and the people were completely
self-interested, the membership of these groups
would grow exponentially to mirror more closely
the estimated 80% of the population who live in
poverty.
Further, rational actors seeking to promote
their own interests will not likely risk their lives
on a daily basis, even if it comes with a paycheck.
Death is a risk for many members of each group.
Members of the FARC and the AUC must face
the prospect of armed engagements with each
other and with the Colombian military, the possibility of torture at the hands of their enemies
should they be captured, and reprisal from their
comrades should they choose to withdraw from
active involvement (Richani 2000). Similarly,
one might argue that the FARC and theAUC are
havens for career criminals seeking unconventional employment; certainly a number of these
individuals are found within the ranks, but for
a truly rational criminal, employment with a
private drug cartel would likely provide much
better hope for survival and future economic
prosperity.
No single social science theory can explain
any situation completely. In the case of the
Colombian Civil War, rational choices do play
some role in the decisions of individuals to join
the FARC or the AUe. However, culturally
based factors also playa significant, if not major,
role in explaining how movement leaders have
mobilized masses of peasants to support their
causes. Along with fighting for a paycheck,
lower-echelon members of FARC and AUC are
also battling for the protection of the Colombian
way of life. This brings about the question of
whether the leaders of these movements have the
Colombian citizens' best interests in mind, or if
their efforts to organize private armies in the
name of Colombian preservation are complex
fronts disguising their true desires to further
their own material gains.
CONCLUSION

Despite claims made by the government
and other factions that they desire peace, all
indicators show that the level of violence in the
Colombian Civil War is not subsiding and is
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more likely escalating. Recent U.S. foreign policy
includes an aid package to provide the Colombian military with equipment and training to
escalate the fight against drug supplies. The government continues to assert that the FARC is the
nation's principal institution of drug trafficking
and has stated its desire to use the new military
strength to make a final push into the south,
implying a desire to once again take the offensive
to FARC-controlled areas Qohnson 2000). Such
an event would have significant effects on the
future of both the FARC and the AUe.
The FARC and AUC have successfully
used culture-based collective action mechanisms
to mobilize followers to their cause. If the
increasing foreign influence on Colombian
domestic politics has adverse affects on the peasant population, it is likely that the FARC's cultural framing mechanism as Colombia's national
protector will continue to grow stronger, either
leading to an increase in its political and military
influence or an increase in casualties as the
violence escalates. If the FARC is significantly
weakened by a new military offensive, the AUC
will likely grow stronger, and it will be interesting to see if the paramilitaries will continue to
adapt their cultural framing approach to 'the
changing situation. It also remains to be seen
what approach AUC leaders will take to legitimize their cause should the anti-drug efforts
begin to target them to the same degree as the
FARe.
The leaders of these organizations take
advantage of their armies to promote their own
welfare. While the evidence I have presented
does not prove that leaders of the FARC and
AUC are simply self-interested individuals seeking to satisfY their own interests, I do maintain
that enough evidence exists to raise questions
about their motives. The extreme amount of
money involved in the drug trade, the internal
divisions within the leadership of the groups, the
FARC's kidnapping of individuals it professes
to protect, and the AUC's slaughter of peasants
it claims to defend all cast doubt upon the
motives presented by these groups to their own
members as well as to the world. Despite the fact
that the military has scaled back its counterinsurgency efforts and the government appears
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willing to negotiate peace, the FARC and the
AUC continue to fortifY themselves and escalate
their offensive campaigns. Perhaps the best summation of the situation is provided by Guerrero
Baron: each of the warring factions believes it can
win, so they do not wish to negotiate (2001, 18).
The years to come may determine the victor of
the civil war and the emergent dominant Colombian culture, or the proponents of conflicting
interests and ideologies may continue to do
battle for an indefinite period of time.

Josh Wheatley is a senior from Clinton, Utah,
majoring in international politics. After graduation
he will attend the Master of Pacific and International Affoirs program at the University of California San Diego.
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